Legal systems have different traditions about how to "prove" a contract for the sale of personal property. Most legal systems today permit the contract to be proved by any means but some States require that the agreement be concluded in or evidenced by writing. The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods adopts a freedom-of-form rule but authorizes a State to declare that the rule does not apply when the seller or buyer has its place of business in that State. This essay studies the consequences of such a declaration. The Convention text does not expressly state the consequences. The Convention's travaux preparatoires suggest that this silence was deliberate. Doctrine and court opinions are divided on whether the writing formalities of the declaring State always apply or the formalities, if any, of the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law govern. In the absence of a consensus, this essay argues that the writing formalities of the declaring State apply. The argument is based on the policies implicit in the decision of non-declaring Contracting States to adhere to a Convention that allows certain Contracting States to opt out of the freedom-ofform rule. The result is consistent with recent private international law treaties that, while providing liberal rules that favor freedom of form, direct application of the fundamental policies not only of the forum but also of other jurisdictions.
INTRODUCTION
Twenty-five years ago I purchased a copy of Tahawi's Kita-b at-Shurut at-Kabir. The Arabic text of this loth century study of the law of sales 2 is reprinted as transcribed from a manuscript preserved in the S[teymaniye Library in Istanbul. There is no translation of the Arabic text but a detailed English-language introduction describes in detail the career of Abu Ja'far Ahmad b. Muhammad b.
Sa[ama at-Azdiat-Tahawi, the nature of the shurut (conditions), the contents of TahawT's chapter on sales, and the historical context in which Tahawi worked. For a reader like me, trained in the common law tradition of the United States of America and with only a general understanding of the rich religious and legal traditions of Islamic thought, most of the details set out in the Introduction were both new and illuminating. I was, however, particularly interested in the editor's analysis of how the Hanafi school of thought reconciled the refusal to allow written documents as legal proof with the wide-spread use of such documents in practice at that time. 3 Coming from a jurisdiction that requires "some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made,"-4 I recognized how difficult it would be to harmonize these different legal traditions. This essay examines the attempt to harmonize these different traditions by the United Nations Sales Convention. As explained in what follows, the attempt failed to provide total harmony. The Convention allows a contract to be proved by any means but permits some States to become parties to the Convention but to opt out of this general rule. The essay explores the consequence of a State opting out.
THE UN CONVENTION "FREEDOM-OF-FORM" PROVISIONS
Although the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 5 adopts many uniform legal rules for the cross-border sale of goods on some issues, the Convention tolerates non-uniformity. One such issue is whether the formation, modification and termination of contracts must satisfy formal writing requirements. Article 11 provides that "a contract of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing and is not subject to any other requirements as to form. It may be proved by any means, including witnesses." But Articles 12 and 96 of the final convention text state that this freedom from written form does not apply if a Contracting State so declares as to contracts with a business located in the declaring State. 6 As was reported at the 1980 Diplomatic Conference in Vienna, "Article [12] recognizes that some States consider that it is an important element of public policy that contracts or their modification or abrogation be in writing."-7 As of June 2012, eleven of the 78 Contracting States have made a declaration under Article 96.
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An Article 96 declaration raises the following practical issue: what law on written form governs when a merchant from a declaring State deals with a seller or buyer in a non-declaring Contracting State? Doctrine and case law provide a variety of answers. The difficulty of the question is illustrated by the differing responses of the late Professors John Honnold and Peter Schlechtriem, who were not only pre-eminent commentators but who also participated actively as delegates to the 1980 Diplomatic Conference and the preparatory work of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The following sections of this essay explore possible answers to the question. How these articles are read may differ depending on whether the dispute is brought before a court in Chile, a court in France, or before an arbitrat tribunal. Recognizing that Chile's Article 96 declaration evidences the importance placed on written form by its government, a court in Chile may be more likely to conclude that the requirements of Chilean law govern. A court in France, on the other hand, may not feel as compelled to adopt this approach. An arbitral tribunal, a fortiori, may have more flexibility in its analytic options depending on the choice of law or arbitral rules chosen by the parties. In principle, however, the interpretation and outcome should be the same no matter which forum hears the dispute.' 2 When reading these articles the basic issue is to determine the consequence of an Article 96 declaration. On the one hand, the articles might be read to require the parties to satisfy the specific writing requirements of the declaring State (here Chile).1 3 On the other hand, Article 96 might be read to say that a declaration excludes application of the freedom-of-form provisions of the Convention but is silent as to the consequences of the declaration. In the absence of a specific direction as to consequences, the forum might consult rules of private international law-as it would in the absence of the Convention-to apply the writing requirements, if any, of the law applicable by virtue of these rules. The first of these alternatives is said to be the minority view, while the latter is said to be the majority view.' A more realistic hypothetical case, as shown by the reported litigation, would have the parties conclude a written contract but later enter into an oral agreement modifying the contract. Article 29 of the Convention deals with modifications and requires no particular form unless the parties agree that modifications must be in writing. Articles 12 and 96 specifically refer to Article 29.
I°UN Sales Convention, supra n. 5, Art. 1(1)(b). 11 in this essay I assume that Chile is entitled to male an Article 96 declaration. That article, however, authorizes a State to mal e a declaration only if its "legislation requires contracts of sale to be concluded or evidenced in writing." This limitation is sometimes overloolked. It is sometimes said, for example, that the United States of America could choose to mal e an Article 96 declaration. The relevant US legislation, supra n. 3, neither requires a contract to be concluded in writing nor requires that it be evidenced by writing.
12 5ee UN Sales Convention, supra n. 5, Art. 7(1) ("In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had ... to the need to promote uniform in its application...').
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A variation on this interpretation is to require a written form but leave it to the forum hearing the dispute to craft a "uniform" form of writing requirement.
14iain to the commentators and cases that support each view may be found in, Support for each of these alternatives may be found in the travauxpreparatoires ("legislative" history), doctrine and the opinions of courts or arbitral tribunals. The following sections of the essay consider each of these sources in turn.
TRAVAUX PREPARATOI RES
The travauxpre'paratoires do not provide an answer to the question of the consequence of an Article 96 declaration but do suggest that the answer was deliberately left unresolved.
1 5 Deliberations at the 1980 Diplomatic Conference support this suggestion. The question had been noted in governmental comments on the draft Convention to be submitted to the conference but no amendments were submitted before or during the conference directly addressing the issue.
1 6 Delegates, who spoke to the issue, read the effect of the draft text in different ways. The Austrian delegate complained that:
"f/]n the event that a contract concluded verbally between two States, one of which had entered into a reservation and the other had not, gave rise to litigation and the litigation came under the jurisdiction of the second State, the judge would be required to respect the reservation and declare that the contract was not valid." (emphasis added)
17
While he also criticized the text of the article, an English delegate disagreed with the analysis of the Austrian delegate:
"[the UK] delegation was not sure that, faced with a situation of that kind, the judge in a State which had not entered a reservation would necessarily declare that the contract was not valid since, while article 11 [article 12 in the final CISG text] excluded the application of certain provisions of the Convention, it did not provide for a positive replacement formula such as an obligation to conclude a contract in writing."-
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The Swiss delegate also noted the lack of precision in Article 12 and suggested there was a contradiction between that article and Article 96. He stated:
"Obviously, the aim of article 11 [article 12 in the final CISG text] was to impose the written form when one of the parties had its place of business in a State which had made a reservation; but that aim was not clearly expressed in the text of the article, which merely indicated that certain provisions did not apply, but did not state legal criteria applicable in the cases where a form other than writing had been used in a country which had not made a declaration." (emphasis added)
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He called for redrafting Articles 12 and 96 but did not spell out how they contradicted each other. His drafting concerns, however, were ultimately not addressed, leaving the different textual interpretations unresolved.
Evidence that the failure to address the consequences of an Article 96 declaration was deliberate may be found in the prior drafting history within the UNCITRAL. When, in 1977, the full Commission met to adopt the draft text, a proposal was made to add the following paragraph to a draft freedom-of-form provision (i.e. what is Article 11 of the Convention):
Article 32 of the 1969 United Nations Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that travauxpreparatoires may be consulted to confirm a "plain meaning" reading of a treaty text or to determine the meaning if a "plain meaning" reading is ambiguous or obscure, or leads to manifestly unreasonable results. Arguments pro and con were presented. In support it was said that this achieved the "proper balance" between jurisdiction that insisted on written formalities and those that did not.
2 Those opposed argued that the proposal would set aside freedom of form even in cases where the law applicable was of a State that did not require written formalities.
22 Without resolving this debate, the Commission agreed to refer the proposal to a Special Drafting Group consisting of representatives from Brazil, the German Democratic Republic, Nigeria, Singapore, Sweden, the USSR, and the USA. This group recommended that there should be freedom of form but States should be permitted to declare that this provision would not apply where any party had its place of business in a declaring State. Unlike the proposal referred to it, the group did not spell out what legal rules applied if the Convention rule was made inapplicable by such a declaration. In other words, the recommendation neither adopted nor rejected the original proposal; it deliberately left the issue of consequences ambiguous. The Commission adopted the recommendation, which in substance is the draft text submitted to the 1980 Diplomatic Conference.
25 Neither the special drafting group nor the Commission explained why the issue of consequences was left unresolved.
This issue had not been resolved in the earlier work within the Commission and its Working Group on Sales. Several proposals had been made that would give effect to writing requirements of States whose domestic law required contracts to be in writing. These proposals were not adopted, but they were never definitively rejected.
The issue of written form was contentious from the beginning. A 1970 study prepared by members of UNCITRAL's Working Group on Sales rejected a proposal by the USSR that make the writing requirements of the declaring State applicable. The reason given was that a "third country" might not give effect to the declaration pursuant to its conflict-of-laws rules.
2 6 When, however, the USSR resubmitted its proposal to the next meeting of the Working Group there was no consensus on this and other issues as to form, so the Working Group decided to refer the question to the full Commission.
27 The Commission reviewed the issue at its fourth session in 1971 and concluded that "the entire problem should be given further consideration by the Working Group."
'28 When it reexamined the issue in 1975, however, the Working Group failed to resolve the issue. As its report for that session states: If these conflict rules lead to the law of a non-dectaring State, Professor Schlechtriem goes on to argue that the forum should apply the Convention's freedom-of-form rules even if the domestic law of the non-declaring State requires some formalities. In the first editions of his treatise Professor John Honnold initially agreed that the declaring State's written formalities should not govern automatically. Like Professor Schlechtriem, he argued that an Article 96 declaration merely excluded the Convention's "freedom-of-form" rules, leaving the forum to reason about the issue of applicable formalities just as it would in the absence of the Convention. "A tribunal will apply the formal requirements of a declaring State only when it finds that, under conflicts principles, the law applicable to this question is the law of the declaring State.
In the author's opinion, if the law of a Contracting
'34 Unlike Although not stated explicitly, the writing requirement would be that of the declaring State rather than a generic writing requirement. Given this new analysis, moreover, there would be no occasion to apply conflicts rules with the possibility that these rules might point to a non-declaring State with written form requirements.
A majority of commentators, Professor Schlechtriem suggests, agree with his analysis. 37 Even
Professor Harry Ftechtner, the editor of the fourth edition of the Honnotd Treatise, rejects Professor Honnotd's final analysis. "The reviser of the current edition," Professor Ftechtner writes, "believes that the position adopted in the first editions of the treatise rather than the analysis proposed in the third edition is correct because it more accurately reflects the drafting history and purposes of Articles 96 and 12."
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There is less agreement, however, on Professor Schlechtriem's suggestion that the Convention's freedom-of-form rules should apply when conflict rules point to the law of a non-declaring State.
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Professor Fechtner would apply instead the domestic form requirements, if any, of the non-declaring State. He concedes that Professor Schtechtriem's solution might be more sensible but "mere commentators" may not change the Convention text if there is at least some sensible basis for a consistent alternate reading. He finds that basis in the "norm of reciprocity": if the declaring State insists (by making the Article 96 declaration) that its domestic rules should apply then the non-declaring State can fairly apply its form requirements when conflict rules lead to application of that State's law. 4°N otwithstanding Professor Ftechtner's retraction and Professor Schtechtriem's declaration that his is the majority view, doctrine has yet to provide a definitive answer to the question of what consequence follows from an Article 96 declaration. Professor Honnold did not himself recant and Professor Schtechtriem himsetf 4 l lists numerous authors who take the "minority" view. In other words, doctrine provides little more guidance than the travauxpreparatoires to resolving the question of whether the Chilean written formalities apply to the contract between the Chilean exporter and French importer.
35 Id.
36 Supra n. 29, at §129.
37 Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, supra n. 14, at Art. 12, para. 2. Footnote 5 of this text lists the commentators who fall in the "minority" and "prevailing" categories.
5 8john Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales Under the 1980 UN Convention, §129 (Kluwer Law International, 4th ed. 2009) [hereinafter "Honnold-Flechtner Treatise"] . Professor Flechtner goes on to argue that always to apply the law of the declaring State would provide an incentive for States to malke article 96 declarations and thus undermine the Convention's goal of uniform rules for sales transactions. This, however, is a mal e-weight argument. Only the very, very few States whose domestic legislation requires contracts of sale to be concluded in or evidenced by writing may malke the declaration. The threat to uniformity is extremely slight.
Schiechtriem & Schwenzer, supra n. 14, at Art. 12, para. 3.
4°H onnold-Flechtner Treatise, supra n. 38, §129. 4 6 For the first view, the Digest cites four cases, while for the opposing view it cites four cases and an interpretive ruling of the High Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation. (To the latter group, a recent French decision of the cour de cassation may now be added.) 47 If the Digest is accurate, courts in Belgium and Russia 48 (and now France) apply the written form requirements of the declaring State, while courts in Hungary, the Netherlands and the United States 49 apply the written requirements of the applicable law as determined by a conflicts analysis. The Digest carefully avoids indicating which view should be considered the better one.
If one looks not just at outcomes but also at reasons given by these courts one finds little help with the analysis. Opinions holding that an Article 96 declaration entails application of the written formalities of the declaring State merely cite the fact that the seller or buyer has its place of business in a State that has made a declaration. A lower US district court argues that this result follows from the "plain language" of Article 96 only to be reversed by the appellate court, which concludes that 42 UNCITRAL Digest of Case Law on the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods, Art. 12, para. 4 the plain language in fact compels reference to the law determined by private international law. 5° 
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Citing to a secondary source but not itself studying the travaux preparatoires, the appellate court suggests that drafting history buttresses its analysis.
53
The US appellate court opinion perceives its analysis to be the majority view. Court decisions alone, however, are so few, so divided in outcome, and so sparse in reasoning that it is difficult to justify the appellate court's conclusion on the basis of court decisions alone.
CONCLUSION
How then should a court or arbitral tribunal decide what written formalities, if any, apply to the oral contract between the seller from Chile and the buyer from France? Despite references to majority or prevailing views by some authors and courts, the preceding survey of drafting history, doctrine, and court opinions demonstrates that at the very least there is no consensus and more probably a relatively evenly-weighted divergence in views. Concluding that the issue is still an open one, I provide the following analysis.
I concur with Professor Schtechtriem and others that Articles 12 and 96 exclude application of the freedom-of-form provisions of the Convention. The language of these articles is unambiguous: the Convention does not apply if any party has its place of business in a declaring State. I thus reject the first of Professor Honnotd's two reasons-'"any party' could refer the application of Article 12 to both parties to the transaction" -for reading Article 96 to require application of the writing requirements of a declaring State.
It is the next step in the analysis that is problematic. If the Convention does not apply, it is argued that one must look to private international law rules that will lead to the domestic law of some State. Recourse to private international law may be justified either because the court would look to those rules if there were no Convention or because Article 7(2) continues to govern notwithstanding the Article 96 dectaration. 54 No matter which of these justifications is looked to, however, application of . The quoted opinion is that of two of the three-judge court; the dissenting judge wrote that "it still appears that, given the plain language of this international treaty, its structure, and its purposes, a written contract is required where, as here, one of the relevant countries has exercised its right to malke an Article 96 declaration." For analysis similar to the majority, see Rechtbanl Rotterdam, the Netherlands, 12 July 2001, English translation http: /isw3.[wopaeed u/ es/ 010712 1htm (accessedll7J un-12).
53 Id.
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The latter argument assumes that notwithstanding an Article 96 declaration the issue of form remains a matter governed by the Convention but not expressly settled in it. UN Sales Convention, supra n. 5, Art. 7(2) ("Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conform ity with the general principles on which it is based ... "). Assuming this is correct, one must still consider that before applying private international law rules the gap is first to be filled in conformity with the "general principles on which [the Convention] is
